In Chapter Six of Travels of a T-Shirt, Rivoli explains Chinese dominance in the textile industry. She introduces the reader to the major forces at work in China in the race to the bottom: supply and price of labor, lack of alternatives and experience, hukou, and Custody and Repatriation laws. Also, she explains how activists and global capitalists have inadvertently raised the bottom of the textile labor market since the beginning of the industry.
Clearly, China has the advantage in the textile industry when it comes to labor supply and price. I think their population size and type (unskilled farm-type) are enough to secure a win in almost any labor market. However, the force behind hukou and Custody and Repatriation laws has given China an even greater advantage in textile trade. I was surprised to find out how difficult it is for the Chinese to secure a job. Hukou demands that workers bring their labor to the factories, but not themselves, and they have no security in housing, healthcare, or pensions. How can one not bring oneself to work (p. 88)? Custody and Repatriation laws also make it nearly impossible to keep from breaking the law. Work documents are difficult to obtain because it takes a lot of time and the documents are costly. It is also upsetting to realize that people without documents can be detained in prison and tortured (p. 89). For me, the most influential passage in this chapter connects the Chinese laborers of today with the Bracero workers of the U.S. past. The fact that the U.S. once implemented a policy that took advantage of laborers the way China is currently taking advantage of its citizens, makes me more aware of the injustice of our country’s actions.
Rivoli surprised me with her explanation of the relationship between activists and capitalists. I understand how these two groups have helped raise the bottom of the textile market, but I do not understand why Rivoli calls the cry to stop the race to the bottom “nonsensical” (p. 100). In defense of the textile race to the bottom, she says the bottom is not as low as it once was, and conscience, religion, and politics have made work in the mills much better (p. 101). It sounds like she is advocating dull, low-paying mill work. My argument against her advocacy is this: the bottom is not being raised in developing countries where textile mills would be the most profitable. Most developing countries have highly corrupt governments and no labor laws.
In Chapter Seven, Rivoli shows how difficult trade has become in the U.S. textile market. She explains the dominance of politics in the U.S. textile trade, and lists the seemingly countless number of textile trade agreements the U.S. has put forth since World War II. Finally, she examines the fall of the Multi-Fiber Agreement. She discovers how trade agreement and action is even slower and more complex when breaking down old regimes than when building them.
The dominance of politics in U.S. textile trade can be explained by the size of the U.S. manufacturing base; strength of industry alliances; shared cultural, historical, and geographic bonds; and the trade-cautious American public. However, the most interesting thing I discovered in the reading is how textile lobbies have been successful in creating a protectionist regime that is totally against free-trade and in making U.S. leaders look like fools. Protectionism was highly criticized in last week’s G20 summit meetings. In a global financial crisis, countries cannot afford to close trade barriers. I believe this includes the textile industry. Also, American leaders and policymakers have been the front-runners for free-trade, yet the most competitive industry has been closed to free-trade. Keeping the textile industry closed damages international relationships. Again, the financial crisis is a good reason not to make your neighbors and loaning countries upset.